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Are medical ethicists out of touch?
Practitioner attitudes in the US and UK
towards decisions at the end of life
Donna L Dickenson Imperial College School of Medicine, London
Abstract
Objectives—To assess whether UK and US health
care professionals share the views of medical ethicists
about medical futility, withdrawing/withholding
treatment, ordinary/extraordinary interventions, and
the doctrine of double eVect
Design, subjects and setting–A 138-item attitudinal
questionnaire completed by 469 UK nurses studying
the Open University course on “Death and Dying”
was compared with a similar questionnaire
administered to 759 US nurses and 687 US doctors
taking the Hastings Center course on “Decisions near
the End of Life”.
Results–Practitioners accept the relevance of concepts
widely disparaged by bioethicists: double eVect, medical
futility, and the distinctions between heroic/ordinary
interventions and withholding/ withdrawing treatment.
Within the UK nurses’ group a “rationalist” axis of
respondents who describe themselves as having “no
religion” are closer to the bioethics consensus on
withholding and withdrawing treatment.
Conclusions—Professionals’ beliefs diVer substantially
from the recommendations of their professional bodies
and from majority opinion in bioethics. Bioethicists
should be cautious about assuming that their opinions
will be readily accepted by practitioners.
(Journal of Medical Ethics 2000;26:254–260)
Keywords: Death and dying; withdrawal of care; refusal of
treatment
Introduction
For the past thirty years bioethicists’ bread-and-
butter has been critical examination of faulty think-
ing in biomedical practice. Where stereotypes and
muddle prevailed, we have seen it as our task to
bring philosophical clarity. On the face of it this is
an admirable task, but some professional reputa-
tions have been built on clever hypotheticals with
little relation to everyday practice.1 Furthermore,
consequentialist approaches have tended to domi-
nate, particularly in the area of death and dying.
For example, the President’s Commission2 and
other US oYcial recommendations3 rejected the
distinction between withholding and withdrawing
treatment because they have the same eVect. Simi-
larly, clinicians who believe that there is a
distinction (and that withdrawing treatment is
more serious) might be less likely to initiate poten-
tially useful treatments which they may later have to
withdraw. Both these arguments are drawn from
ethical consequentialism. By contrast, other ap-
proaches such as narrative ethics,4–7 hermeneutics,8
the ethics of care,9 or a power model10 might view
withdrawing care as diVerent from withholding it:
new relationships and expectations have been built
up during the period in which care has been
oVered.
Likewise, the consensus in biomedical ethics has
generally been against the distinction between
ordinary and extraordinary treatment. Whereas
extraordinary treatment can permissibly be for-
gone, in Catholic theology, ordinary treatment
cannot.11 As stated by Cardinal Jean Villot, Vatican
Secretary of State, in 1970, the same distinction
applies to the doctor’s duties as to the patient’s:
“A medical man does not have to use all the tech-
niques of survival oVered him by a constantly crea-
tive science. In many cases, would it not be useless
torture to impose vegetative resuscitation in the
final stages of an incurable sickness?”12
However, what was extraordinary in 1970, when
Cardinal Villot made his pronouncement, may now
be ordinary. With the fluid boundary between what
is technologically extraordinary one day and
perfectly standard practice the next, there is some
practical basis for scepticism about the distinction,
but many writers in bioethics have concentrated on
the philosophical incoherence of the contrast
instead.13 Other once-standard distinctions which
have come in for “demolition” include that between
“active” and “passive” euthanasia14 and between
relieving suVering versus shortening life, as in the
doctrine of double eVect.15
The concept of medical futility has been a
particular focus of controversy.16 Because an
underpinning definition of futility is crucial to deci-
sions about withholding or stopping interventions,
and because the greatest problem in American
practice has often been seen as the tendency
towards excessive interventions, futility has been a
linchpin concept. Yet bioethicists have been suspi-
cious of futility as merely a rationalisation, or as
“too ambiguous and pejorative a term”.17
Do doctors and nurses still use the concepts
which many bioethicists have done their best to
discredit? If so, do they do so out of ignorance, or is
there a coherent pattern to their attitudes on deci-
sions in death and dying—evidence, perhaps, of
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another sort of consensus than the bioethical one.
In short, is bioethics in touch with what practition-
ers really think?
Methods
For an in-hospital ethics training programme on
“Decisions near the end of life”, the Hastings
Center and the Education Development Center
(EDC) developed a questionnaire on practitioners’
attitudes towards ethical issues in death and dying,
funded by the Kellogg Foundation. This “institu-
tional profile” was piloted with 72 subjects and
reviewed by an external panel of experts in clinical
ethics, sociology, anthropology, health services
research, psychology and statistics. A repeat survey
was administered two months later (n=52). Test
reliability was estimated as good, using several dif-
ferent techniques.18 After this piloting process, the
questionnaire was administered at five test hospitals
ranging in size from 180 to 660 beds. The total
numbers responding were 759 nurses and 687 doc-
tors (369 internists, 174 surgeons, and 144 house
oYcers).
For the Hastings Center, the primary purpose of
the questionnaire was to “ground” the work which
practitioners would be doing in their six-session
training programme, by forcing them to define at
the outset their own attitudes, values and ethical
beliefs on such issues as withdrawing/withholding
ventilation, artificial hydration and nutrition, and
cardiopulmonary resuscitation. For the EDC the
prime interest was in compiling an expanding data-
base reflecting current US practitioner attitudes
towards issues around assisting death and letting
die.19
A UK version of the questionnaire was developed
by the author for an Open University course on
“Death and Dying”, again with both pedagogic and
research objectives. Following a pilot run with 43
UK practitioners, the questionnaire was completed
by 469 UK hospital and hospice nurses who were
students on the Open University course between
1993 and 1997. (Although some questions from the
US instrument were eliminated or redrafted to suit
UK practice, the questions in the tables below used
exactly the same wording, with three very minor
exceptions [tables 1, 2 and 9] in which the UK ver-
sion appears in brackets.)
Completion of the questionnaire was optional on
the Open University course, unlike the US
counterpart, making numbers somewhat lower. In
particular, there were too few doctors for statistical
analysis. No UK doctors appear in the findings
reported in this article, although findings concern-
ing US doctors have been included for interest, and
in some cases, for reporting comparisons between
professions in the US.
The UK group includes a larger proportion of
hospice nurses than the US sample, and therefore
probably a higher exposure to critically or termi-
nally ill patients. However, the US and UK nurse
groups both encountered the questionnaire very
early in their study, so that untutored responses are
being measured. The nurse groups are also broadly
comparable in terms of means for age (US=39.5,
UK=38.0) and number of years in the nursing pro-
fession (US=13.9, UK=15.6).
Although further research is desirable to ascer-
tain UK doctors’ attitudes, UK nurses, of all British
practitioner groups, may well give us the best idea
of how relevant to terminal care are the concepts of
double eVect, futility and heroic/ordinary treat-
ment. The US findings showed that nurses had the
greatest amount of contact with dying people and
surgical attending physicians the least. Nursing
ethics, heavily influenced by the ethics of care,20
might also be particularly reluctant to accept the
authority of the biomedical ethics establishment on
such questions as withdrawing and withholding.
Table 1 Practitioner acceptance of the concepts of medical futility and extraordinary/ordinary treatments
Percentage replying under each category and overall mean (UK nurses, with overall figure for US doctors and nurses in brackets)
on a scale of 1 to 5 (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) to the following questions:
1. The distinction between extraordinary (or heroic) measures and ordinary treatments is helpful in making termination
of treatment decisions.
2. Clinicians need better guidelines to help determine when treatments are medically futile.
3. Clinicians and patients (UK: dying people) generally agree about what constitutes medically futile treatment.
4. Clinicians are not required to provide medically futile treatment, even if a terminally ill patient or family member
demands it.
Question
1 strongly
disagree 2 3 4 5 strongly agree Mean
1) Heroic distinction useful 3% (4%) 8% (7%) 19% (19%) 43% (31%) 26% (39%) 3.80 (3.92)
2) Futility guidelines needed 1% (4%) 5% (7%) 15% (19%) 38% (32%) 41% (39%) 4.12 (3.94)
3) Dying agree 23% (18%) 42% (33%) 18% (28%) 15% (17%) 2% (5%) 2.32 (2.57)
4) Futile treatment not required 5% (26%) 13% (25%) 27% (19%) 37% (14%) 17% (16%) 3.48 (2.67)
Table 2 Awareness of Guidelines
Percentage replying “yes” to the question: Are you aware of any
guidelines at your institution about the following: (US overall figures,
with UK nurses in brackets)
Obtaining DNR orders 88% (64%)
Documenting reasons for DNR order 63% (56%)
Requests for organ donation 77% (56%)
Recording patient’s wishes in medical record 69% (72%)
Obtaining informed consent 84% (77%)
Determining patient capacity to participate in
decisions 61% (40%)
Withholding or stopping mechanical ventilation 53% (37%)
Withholding or stopping artificial nutrition and
hydration 41% (34%)
How to proceed when ethical concerns about a
patient’s care arise 61% (46%)
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Results and discussion
1. MEDICAL FUTILITY AND EXTRAORDINARY
TREATMENT
Question 1 of table 1 shows 69 per cent (UK
nurses) and 70 per cent (US overall) agreeing or
strongly agreeing that the distinction between
extraordinary and ordinary treatment measures is
useful, with 11 per cent in both countries disagree-
ing. (In fact this agreement prevails across all US
professional groups: medical attending physicians
mean 3.88, surgical attendings 4.06, house oYcers
3.89 and nurses 4.02.21)
Consistent with this distinction, which implies
that extraordinary measures are not required
because they impose disproportionate burdens with
minimal results, clinicians in both countries favour
stronger guidelines on medical futility from profes-
sional bodies. (The survey was administered before
the British Medical Association [BMA] guidelines
on withdrawing and withholding treatment were
published in September 1999.) This result on
question 2, table 1, is interesting because awareness
of existing guidelines is reasonably high in both
national groups—although consistently higher in
the US (table 2).
Item 3 of table 1 shows that 65 and 61 per cent
of clinicians (UK and US respectively) disagree or
disagree strongly with the statement that “Clini-
cians and dying people generally agree about what
constitutes medically futile treatment”. Only two
and five per cent, respectively, strongly agree that
they normally reach an accord with dying people
and their families over whether to continue aggres-
sive interventions. In question 4 of table 1, US and
UK practitioners disagree sharply over whether cli-
nicians must provide medically futile treatment if
dying people and their families demand it (although
further research is necessary to determine the level
of significance). This finding contrasts with practi-
tioners’ agreement on the “utility of futility”: what
to do once a treatment has been identified as futile
is another matter. The American majority agree or
strongly agree that clinicians are required to provide
medically futile treatment requested by dying
patients or their families. In contrast, 54 per cent of
UK nurses agree or strongly agree that medically
futile treatment is not obligatory even if patients
and families disagree. (English law is generally
loath to require doctors to act against their clinical
judgment in providing futile treatment.22) United
Kingdom nurses, however, report that futility
causes more discord among clinical teams in the
UK than any other issue, even expensive cardiopul-
monary resuscitation (table 3).
2. TREATMENT WITHDRAWAL
The results so far show that practitioners in both
the UK and the US rely heavily on the linked con-
cepts of heroic/ordinary treatment and medical
futility, although they may disagree on what to do
when patients or their families request treatment
which clinicians deem futile. Here practitioners
disagree with the bioethics consensus, as they do on
withholding and withdrawing treatment (table 4).
Very few US practitioners agree that “we give up
on patients too soon”, consistent with the finding
that US doctors will continue oVering treatment,
even if they judge it medically futile, so long as
patients and families want it. The incentive is to
overtreat in a largely private system of health care
provision23—posing particular problems for last-
chance therapies and managed care.24 The UK
sample contains a high proportion of hospice
nurses, to whom the notion of treatment-at-all-
costs is likely to be anathema. Palliative care is not
seen as treatment withdrawal in hospice philos-
ophy, and aggressive interventions are rejected in
favour of a holistic approach to death and dying.
Table 5 suggests that UK nurses are the most
likely to disagree with accepted bioethical wisdom:
only one in five agrees or agrees strongly that with-
holding and stopping treatment are the same in
ethical terms. Over three in five, 62 per cent,
disagree or disagree strongly with the statement.
Overall only US medical attending physicians are as
likely to agree as disagree that there is no ethical
diVerence. Every other group is more likely to disa-
gree than agree with the “oYcial” view, ie the BMA
Table 3 Sources of intra-staV conflict identified by UK nurses
How often do disagreements among staV arise over the following?
(1=almost never, 5=almost always) (mean and percentage answering
either 3, 4 or 5)
Determination of patients’ capacity to make
decisions 2.54 51.4%
Adequacy of the informed consent process 2.45 48.8%
Use of patients in research projects 1.96 30.9%
How information is given to patients and families 2.63 55.6%
Deciding when a treatment is medically futile 2.70 60.3%
What treatment alternative is best for a patient 2.69 58.4%
When to consider the economic costs of a
patient’s care 2.20 38.8%
Table 4 Undertreatment and overtreatment in UK and US practice
On a scale where 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree, to what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
1. Sometimes I feel the treatments I oVer my patients are overly burdensome.
2. Sometimes I feel we give up on patients too soon.
UK nurses US internists
US medical
attendings US house oYcers US nurses
1. Treatment burdensome 3.31 (52%) 3.43 (58%) 3.02 (45%) 4.01 (78%) 3.34 (51%)
2. Give up too soon 2.33 (20%) 2.22 (15%) 1.84 (7%) 2.05 (8%) 2.10 (12%)
For items 1 and 2, diVerences by profession and nationality are significant at p<0.0001 (one-way analysis of variance).
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guidelines of September 1999 (see references 2 and
3 for US).
3. DOUBLE EFFECT AND EUTHANASIA
Some bioethicists, and most supporters of euthana-
sia, regard the doctrine of double eVect as a hypo-
critical remnant of Catholic moral theology25 26; but
it is accepted by many practitioners. In England the
High Court clarified in the 1997 case of Annie
Lindsell that existing law could accommodate a
general practitioner’s willingness, at the request of a
woman dying of motor neurone disease, to
prescribe analgesic medication in quantities that
might have the eVect of shortening her life. As table
6 indicates, this judgment confirms what many
practitioners already believe.
Only three per cent of UK nurses disagreed or
strongly disagreed with this statement. The great
majority reject the argument (made by the
Voluntary Euthanasia Society in the 1994 hearings
before the House of Lords Select Committee on
Euthanasia) that it is hypocritical to give analgesics
in the knowledge that the patient’s death may
result, while claiming only to be concerned with
pain relief. Likewise, practitioners largely accept
the distinction between “passive” and “active”
euthanasia, distrusted by many bioethicists, to the
extent that they see an important moral distinction
between stopping treatment and assisting suicide.27
Although the consequences of the two actions may
be the same, seven out of eight practitioners
surveyed, across countries and professions, agree or
strongly agree that the content of the actions is
ethically diVerent (table 7).
Junior doctors in the US are most likely to agree
with this statement, and US nurses most likely to
disagree, although only 11 per cent of the latter
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement.
It is often said that nurses are more unwilling to see
treatment stopped than doctors, because they are
more intimately involved in patient care. In the case
of the persistent vegetative state (PVS) patient Tony
Bland, for example, nurses initially opposed the
decision by the family and consultant to withdraw
artificial nutrition and hydration.28 But both nurses
and doctors surveyed reject the argument that
because the consequences of treatment withdrawal
and assisted suicide are the same, there is no ethical
distinction. When the question of disconnecting
feeding tubes is tackled more explicitly, a slightly
diminished majority of practitioners still uphold the
distinction between that and euthanasia, as table 8
indicates.
4. PATIENT PARTICIPATION AND PRACTITIONER
SATISFACTION
On attitudes towards patient autonomy and partici-
pation in decision making, UK nurses demonstrate
a greater commitment than any of the US groups,
as shown in table 9, particularly questions 1 and 2.
(Note that a high score on question 1 indicates
strong commitment to letting the patient decide,
Table 5 Is withdrawing treatment ethically diVerent from never starting it?
Percentage agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement “There is no ethical diVerence between withholding (not starting) a life
support measure and stopping it once it has been started”, with mean score (in parentheses), on scale of 1 to 5 (1=strongly
disagree, 5=strongly agree)
UK nurses US medical attendings US surgical attendings US house oYcers US nurses US overall
20% (2.39) 43% (3.00) 38% (2.84) 44% (2.96) 27% (2.49) 34% (2.71)
Table 6 Practitioner agreement with the doctrine of double eVect
Percentage agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement: “Sometimes it is appropriate to give pain medication to relieve
suVering, even if it may hasten a patient’s death” with mean score (in parentheses), on scale of 1 to 5 (1=strongly disagree,
5=strongly agree).
UK nurses US medical attendings US surgical attendings US house oYcers US nurses US overall
94% (4.67) 94% (4.55) 92% (4.52) 92% (4.56) 86% (4.35) 89% (4.44)
Table 7 Practitioner agreement with distinction between withholding treatment and assisting suicide
Percentage agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement: “To allow patients to die by forgoing or stopping treatment is ethically
diVerent from assisting in their suicide”, with mean score (in parentheses), on scale of 1 to 5 (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly
agree).
UK nurses US medical attendings US surgical attendings US house oYcers US nurses US overall
87% (4.22) 89% (4.47) 86% (4.44) 94% (4.57) 85% (4.33) 87% (4.41)
Table 8 Practitioner agreement with the statement: “Disconnecting a feeding tube is killing a patient”
Percentage agreeing or strongly agreeing with statement, on scale of 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree, with mean score in
parentheses.
UK nurses US medical attendings US surgical attendings US house oYcers US nurses US overall
18% (2.22) 11% (1.84) 12% (1.89) 9% (1.62) 12% (1.97) 12% (1.89)
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whereas the opposite is true on questions 2 and 3.)
Yet as table 10 demonstrates, they are also consid-
erably more satisfied with the extent to which these
rights are respected in clinical practice. I have
explored this interesting and unexpected juxtaposi-
tion in greater detail elsewhere29 and only wish to
repeat one point here. The authors of the American
survey, Solomon et al, were puzzled that US practi-
tioners were very dissatisfied with the care received
by terminally ill patients, but disagreed with
professional bodies’ recommendations. United
Kingdom nurses, like their US medical and nursing
colleagues, disagree with such recommendations:
they believe that withdrawing care is diVerent from
withholding it, and they think futility is a meaning-
ful concept. However, UK nurses are much happier
with practice in terminal care (table 10). This
suggests that there is no connection between satis-
faction or dissatisfaction with patient care and
disagreement with the bioethics consensus.
5. RATIONALISM, RELIGION AND ATTITUDES
TOWARDS NATIONAL GUIDELINES
A substantial number of UK nurses surveyed
describe themselves as having “no religion”. This
group, whom I call “rationalists”,30 shows a statisti-
cally significant degree of scepticism about the dis-
tinction between withholding and withdrawing
treatment, but not about the doctrine of double
eVect concerning unintentionally hastening death
(table 11). Although double eVect is originally a
Catholic doctrine, UK nurses of all religions, and of
no religion, accept it. In fact practitioners who have
no religion actually accept it slightly more strongly
and more consistently (having a lower standard
deviation). This is probably because they have
fewer qualms about intentionally hastening death
than the other two groups. On the other two ques-
tions, the “rationalist” minority does hold views
which are significantly diVerent. They are far more
likely to agree (with the professional bodies’
consensus) that there is no diVerence between
withdrawing treatment once started and not
oVering it in the first place. And they are much
more sympathetic to assisted suicide, a diVerence
significant at the .0001 level.
This table oVers us a suggestive answer to the
question of why practitioners’ attitudes are intrac-
table to persuasion by national recommendations:
these attitudes could correlate with religious
belief—or lack of it. Academic ethicists are likely to
be rationalists themselves; others like Tristram
Engelhardt, himself an active church member, are
concerned to develop a common core of principles
on which believers and non-believers could all
agree.31 Does the secular orientation of modern
bioethics help to account for the distance between
the bioethical consensus and practitioners’ beliefs?
Conclusions
Whether practitioners do accept doctrines and
concepts widely disparaged by bioethicists says
nothing, of course, about whether they should
accept them. To argue otherwise is to fall prey to
the naturalistic fallacy.32 Solomon et al generally
assumed that practitioners should not distinguish
between withdrawing and withholding care, in the
face of national commission recommendations to
Table 9 Attitudes about patient involvement in decision making at the end of life
Extent of agreement or disagreement with the following statements (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) (mean and percentage
answering 4 or 5)
UK nurses US medical attendings US surgeons US house oYcers US nurses US overall
1. 4.55 (93%) 4.39 (86%) 4.44 (87%) 4.49 (87%) 4.52 (89%) 4.48 (87%)
2. 2.74 (28%) 3.47 (56%) 3.70 (65%) 3.55 (59%) 3.31 (50%) 3.42 (54%)
3. 2.44 (16.5%) 2.68 (29%) 2.95 (35%) 2.18 (29%) 2.38 (19%) 2.51 (23%)
1. All competent patients, even if they are not considered terminally ill, have the right to refuse life support, even if that refusal may lead to death.
2. Many patients perfer to let their caregiver make the decision about what treatment is best.
3. Many patients prefer not to know they are dying.
Table 10 Satisfaction with patient involvement in practice (mean and percentage answering 4 or 5)
UK nurses
US medical
attendings US surgeons US house oYcers US nurses US overall
1. Patients informed 3.11 (44%) 3.40 (49%) 3.51 (50%) 3.23 (43%) 2.75 (25%) 3.04 (35%)
2. Patients grasp what told 3.12 (43%) 3.32 (42%) 3.46 (49%) 3.22 (39%) 2.80 (26%) 3.05 (35%)
3. Patients get help to choose 3.05 (40%) 3.29 (43%) 3.38 (44%) 3.08 (35%) 2.77 (26%) 3.00 (33%)
4. StaV find out patients’ wishes 3.31 (51%) 3.22 (40%) 3.32 (39%) 2.91 (27%) 2.79 (26%) 2.97 (31%)
5. Wishes recorded 3.43 (56%) 3.17 (37%) 3.19 (36%) 3.19 (37%) 2.61 (21%) 2.88 (29%)
6. Ethical issues discussed 3.02 (41%) 3.16 (39%) 3.07 (31%) 2.99 (31%) 2.69 (26%) 2.88 (31%)
(DiVerences by profession and nationality significant at p<.0001, one-way analysis of variance)
On a scale where 1=not very satisfied and 5=very satisfied: at your workplace, how satisfied are you about the extent to which:
1. Patients are informed of diVerent care alternatives.
2. Patients understand the information they are told about their condition and treatment alternatives.
3. Patients get the help they need to make decisions about care alternatives.
4. StaV find out what critically and terminally ill patients want.
5. Patients’ wishes are recorded in the medical (UK: and nursing) record.
6. Ethical issues in a patient’s care are discussed by staV.
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the contrary. If implemented, Solomon et al felt, the
oYcial bodies’ directives would undermine the
“technological imperative” of overtreatment and
aggressive intervention at the end of life. But even
though US practitioners generally agreed that
dying patients were more likely to be overtreated
than abandoned too soon, they had not accepted
the corollary attitudes that would weaken the grip
of the technological imperative. For example, they
were loath to withdraw care once started, because
they felt that stopping treatment was more serious
than withholding it in the first place.
One solution proposed by Solomon et al was that
bioethicists should step up their eVorts to educate
practitioners about national guidelines.33 Solomon
and her colleagues often appear to accept scientific
positivism34: bioethics comes across as an activity in
which specialists make scientifically validated ad-
vances and practitioners accept them. I want to argue
the other way around: practitioners can educate us,
and empirical evidence about what they really think
can add maturing sophistication to the traditional
analytical concerns of bioethics.35 Medical ethics
risks becoming a self-regarding activity if it does not
incorporate what practitioners think and do. This is
certainly not to say that we should slavishly follow
practitioner opinion when we know it to be fuzzy
thinking; but neither should we condemn prac-
titioner opinion as misguided. Nor should we try to
reduce medical ethics to a positivistic model which
we, in our wisdom, can then hand on to clinicians.
Medical ethicists who espouse an a priori model
of decision making, such as principlists, are more
likely to think that practitioners are just plain wrong
if they persist in opinions which contradict the col-
lective wisdom of bioethicists. If ethical decision
making is a matter of coherent a priori reasoning,
then there is no reason to expect practitioners to
excel at what they were never trained to do, and
every reason to believe that philosophers will make
a better job of it. Conversely, if the facts of actual
cases make a diVerence, and if an empirical model
of decision making is preferred, then practitioners
can be expected to know something which philoso-
phers do not. If they disagree with national recom-
mendations, that does not necessarily mean that
they are ethically ignorant. Although practitioners
do show a degree of ignorance of national
guidelines, that does not explain all the disparity
between their beliefs and the bioethics consensus.
Perhaps, to paraphrase Thoreau, they simply march
to the beat of a diVerent drummer.
We need to know more about why practitioners
diVer from bioethicists, and from each other, in
their attitudes towards decisions near the end of
life. These findings are preliminary: further re-
search is required to ascertain levels of significance
for comparisons between US and UK practitioners,
and to measure the attitudes of UK doctors. Yet
wanting to know more is an important first step: it
implies that practitioners’ attitudes are not merely
misguided, but may reflect alternative and equally
valid models. One such alternative model of medi-
cal ethics is rooted in phronesis, the Aristotelian
concept of the skills of practical judgment.5 We
would expect practitioners to have particular skills
in practical judgment, and to have something to
teach us. Whether or not we bioethicists want to
accept that particular model, we should at least be
sensitive to the possibility that we are indeed out of
touch.
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